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can play a larger role in determining the differences in productivity 
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productivity or efficiency growth, and thus investment in R&D can play a larger role 
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1. Introduction 
In the light of the recent financial crisis and growth slowdown in the UK and OECD 
economies, it is important to understand the role of supply-side stimuli to speeding up 
recovery and improving productivity, especially in face of recent fiscal consolidation 
(see Crafts, 2013).The UK’s productivity gap at the aggregate level has been lagging 
behind its competitor countries (see Mayhew and Neely, 2006) and hence closing this 
gap at the macro level requires us to understand the determinants of firm-level 
productivity gap with those at the technology frontier. The growth literature has 
identified R&D as capable of creating positive technology spillovers which tend to 
dominate the negative competitive effects from product market rivals(see Bloom et 
al., 2013).In this context, corporate tax policy may play a role in driving innovation 
and thereby firm productivity (see Harris et al., 2009). Meanwhile international 
differences in national taxation policy may adversely affect firm-level performance. In 
conventional growth theory, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Lee and Gordon (2005) 
have looked at whether tax policy can alter the long-run process of economic 
development. Developments in international trade theory (Melitz, 2003; Yeaple, 
2005) meanwhile have emphasized the existence of firm heterogeneity and its 
importance in determining trade activity and intra-industry reallocation of resources. 
Another strand of that literature identifies the factors by which laggard firms can catch 
up to the performance levels of frontier counterparts.5 A key policy inference from all 
this literature is that the broader economic policy environment can affect firm’s 
degree of productivity catch up. 
 One aspect of the policy environment that has been little explored to date is 
how, precisely, taxation affects productivity performance at the firm level. In 
principle, corporate taxation might embody distortionary effects that can be easily 
translated into productivity losses. The negative effects of corporate tax broadly fall 
into two categories :(a) tax expenditure reduces corporate income by constraining the 
resources available for investment and market expansion and (b) taxation can impact 
on dynamic efficiency, absorbing resources that can be alternatively invested in 
                                                          
5Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Girma (2005) address the role of Multinationals in improving 
performance of domestic firms. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) and Bourles et al. (2010) investigate the 
role of product market regulation both within and across industries in productivity performance. 
Griffith et al. (2009) discuss the role of geographic proximity and spillovers generated from frontier 
firms. 
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process innovation, intangible assets and technological upgrading. The latter category 
also includes the possibility of embodied technical change in the purchase of capital 
goods implying further that higher corporate taxation can induce adverse effects on 
capital deepening and productivity improvements by increasing the user cost of 
capital. 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) suggest that there is an equal and proportionate 
relationship between tax exemptions and R&D investment that largely determine the 
location of R&D activity. Similarly, Djankov et al. (2010) and Kneller et al. (2012) 
have found that tax policy can affect other aspects of firm productivity performance 
such as entry and exit decisions. So far, only Arnold et al. (2011) have studied directly 
the link between corporate tax and productivity showing that the growth of firms is 
negatively affected by taxation in more profitable industries. In this paper we set out 
to expand upon the limited evidence in the tax-productivity domain by studying the 
effects of corporate tax levels within a framework of firm productivity catch-up. The 
UK economy is well suited to this sort of analysis for several reasons. In recent 
decades, productivity levels in the UK have substantially fallen behind those of the 
US (Cameron et al., 2005). There also appears to be considerable firm-level 
heterogeneity (Davis et al., 1996; Batelsman and Doms, 2000; Disney et al., 2003) 
both across and within industries. To understand the technology convergence process, 
this heterogeneity needs to be taken into account by examining the gap between the 
productivity of a particular firm and the frontier firm at different points in time. 
In this paper we ask, using UK firm-level data, whether firm’s corporate tax 
burden slows the speed of productivity convergence and, if so, through which 
channels this deceleration is likely to take place. For example, it may occur via a 
reduction in R&D activity, due to higher tax burden at a time of general economic 
slowdown, or by exporters being less competitive. It is now well-established that 
exporting firms tend to be more productive relative to non-exporters, but the evidence 
on the learning effect remains inconclusive for most countries, with the exception of 
some rapidly growing emerging markets (see, for example, Mallick and Yang, 2013). 
If productivity is the basis for a country's competitiveness, such productivity can be 
influenced by the degree of technological innovation at firm level. We therefore 
attempt to examine the productivity effects of taxation, exporting and R&D in the 
context of fiscal consolidation during a time when there has been a general decline in 
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economic activity, and hence ask what can be done to jumpstart a recovery in firm-
level productivity, and thereby achieve productivity convergence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the key 
literature and motivation; section3 introduces a behavioral framework for looking at 
firm productivity convergence; section 4 illustrates data issues and econometric 
specification; section 5 discusses results from baseline estimates; section 6 provides 
some sensitivity analysis regarding the robustness of baseline estimations and section 
7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Motivation & Empirical Strategy 
This paper seeks to investigate any distortionary effects induced by corporate 
tax in association with the two categories namely (a) the impact of taxation on 
investment and market expansion and (b) the impact of taxation on dynamic 
efficiency represented by its interaction with R&D and exports. The main question 
posed is whether taxation on profits affects capital investment. Keuschnig and Ribi 
(2010) have developed a model that links capital investment decisions and financial 
constraints. We elaborate on this framework to test the hypothesis that higher levels of 
corporate tax decreases the amount of working capital available. Less working capital 
results in firms’ inability to obtain credit required for market expansion.6The second 
key question addressed in the paper refers to the distortionary character of corporate 
tax with regard to dynamic efficiency. A novel aspect of our paper is to investigate 
whether tax liabilities are likely to affect firms with greater export orientation 
disproportionally. 
Firm level studies have already suggested evidence of learning effects from 
exporting activity (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Greenaway and Kneller, 2004; 
Greenaway and Yu, 2004; Crespi et al., 2008; Mallick and Yang, 2013).7According to 
this strand of literature, exporters can benefit from knowledge spillovers and contacts 
                                                          
6Gemmell et al. (2012) show that higher corporation tax affects after-tax returns to productivity- 
enhancing investment. This effect is proportionally higher to small firms indicating that small firms are 
more likely to be credit constrained due to tax liabilities and their capacity to raise credit is highly 
dependent on their asset size (Schaller (1993) and Aghion et al. (2007)). 
7 The evidence of learning-by-exporting within a UK context cannot be viewed as conclusive. There 
are studies (Girma et al. (2004), Harris and Li (2009)) that found evidence only for the one side of the 
causality that more productive firms self-select to export. Therefore, the debate is still open and thus it 
remains of interest to explore whether taxation can hinder the exploitation of learning-by-exporting 
effects.  
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with international best practices while purely domestic firms cannot. Consequently, 
exporting firms can grow faster and close quicker the technology gap with the 
frontier. Hence, a follow-up question is whether tax policy restricts export activity, 
hampering technology transfer and thus lowering productivity growth. Similarly, we 
evaluate the effect of corporate tax on firms with different innovation status. In 
productivity catch-up models, the role of R&D is well-established (Griffith et al., 
2003/2004, Cameron, 2006).8 The crucial issue here is whether differences in tax 
policy can generate incentives (or disincentives) for more (less) R&D investment. If 
R&D activity is risky, it is more likely to be undertaken by highly profitable firms. 
This indicates that a progressive corporate tax system might affect adversely firms 
with high levels of innovation. We can test this by looking at the interaction between 
R&D and the tax rate. If both private and social returns to innovation are important 
for productivity convergence, both at firm and industry level, then any negative 
impact of corporate tax on R&D can be crucial both for individual and aggregate 
productivity. Our paper seeks to investigate whether firms with different innovative 
status respond differently to changes in tax policy. 
A series of testable hypotheses regarding the effects of corporate tax on firm’s 
productivity are investigated, with particular reference to distance from the 
productivity frontier and the associated speed of catch up process. We use the FAME 
data base for UK manufacturing firms over the period 2004-2011. The data are mainly 
derived from firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. The behavioral 
framework used is a convergence model, building upon existing work in the 
macroeconomic convergence literature (Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b)). Within 
this set up, taxation has an autonomous effect on productivity growth while also 
interacting with the catch–up process towards the frontier counterpart. 
The implementation of a convergence framework requires a well-specified and 
unbiased measure of total factor productivity (TFP) at the firm level. The appropriate 
estimation technique for TFP depends on the fulfillment of two key criteria. First, 
estimation should address the issue of simultaneity bias between inputs and various 
productivity shocks. Standard parametric techniques that use OLS estimators in Cobb-
Douglas production functions clearly fail to mitigate this problem (Higon (2004, 
                                                          
8 In the productivity convergence literature, R&D has a dual role: first stimulates the rate of innovation 
and second improves the absorptive capacity of the laggard firm. The second role implies that higher 
R&D investment is necessary even if it does not generate direct productivity gains as it contributes to a 
more efficient imitation of the technological advancements of the frontier.   
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2007), Blundell and Bond (2000)). Second, selection bias is likely to exist infirm level 
studies. In a frictionless market environment the least productive firms exit the market 
while new more productive firms enter. TFP estimation should control for the 
correlation between productivity shocks and exit probability.9We use a semi-
parametric methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (OP, hereafter)10 (1996) to 
account for simultaneity and selection bias. This should yield consistent and unbiased 
TFP estimates11 in the presence of unobserved productivity shocks. We also apply 
Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) (2003) non-parametric technique for estimating TFP as a 
robustness check in Section 6. 
 
3. A Model of Firm-level Productivity Convergence 
This section explains the formulation of a productivity catch-up model that can be 
used as a benchmark for the derivation of an empirically testable model.  The starting 
point isamacroeconomicmodel of productivity convergence (see among others, 
Bernard and Jones, 1996a and 1996b; Cameron et al., 2005) that specifies a generic 
production function: 
 ( ), , ,i t i t i tY A f= Χ  [3.1] 
 
Where i denotes firm and t represents time. Y measures value added and Χ  indicates a 
set of production inputs. Parameter A captures unobserved technological shifts over 
time that vary across firms and time. The quantitative equivalent of parameter A is an 
index of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). At any point in time, productivity is evolved 
by the following Autoregressive Distribute Lag ADL (1,1) process: 
 
 , , 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 ,ln ln ln lni t i t i t F t F t i tA a A a A a A uγ − −= + + + +  [3.2] 
                                                          
9The correlation here exists between capital input and the probability to exit. Firms with higher level of 
capital stock are likely to generate more future profits and thus the probability to exit after a negative 
productivity shock is smaller.  
10We have also experimented with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (Table 4 Section 6) estimation 
framework of TFP with no significant differences in results. 
11 Unobserved productivity shock is not the only source of bias in TFP estimates. In our tests of 
robustness, we instrument TFP variable to account for additional measurement errors.  
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Assuming long–run homogeneity 2 3
1
1
1
a a
a
+
=
−
 implies that productivity growth depends 
on relative rather than on absolute convergence. Expression [3.2] can be viewed as an 
Error Correction Model (ECM) that is transformed into: 
 
 
, 1
, 2 , , ,
, 1
ln ln ln F ti t F t i t i t
i t
A
A a A u
A
γ λ −
−
 
∆ = ∆ + + +  
 
 [3.3] 
where 11 aλ = − . Equation [3.3] describes productivity growth in the non-frontier firm 
as a function of autonomous productivity growth in the frontier, a term for technology 
transfer and technological capabilitiesγ  in firm i. A reduced form of [3.3] assumes
2 0a =  and thus the productivity convergence model is written as: 
 , 1, , ,
, 1
ln ln F ti t i t i t
i t
A
A u
A
γ λ −
−
 
∆ = + +  
 
 [3.4] 
 
Equations [3.3] and [3.4] can be used as benchmark econometric specifications for 
estimating the drivers of productivity convergence. Parameter γ refers to 
standardtechnological drivers of firm i, and also captures the autonomous role of 
corporate taxation on productivity. Parameter λ represents the speed of productivity 
convergence between firm i and its frontier counterpart F , and u  is a stochastic error 
term. Corporate taxation is measured by effective tax rate (ETR) and the current 
specification seeks to reveal whether the effect of ETR varies according to the 
position of firm i relative to the frontier. To test this hypothesis, we augment equation 
[3.3] with the following term: 
 , 1 , 1, 2 , , , ,
, 1 , 1
absorptive capacity
ln ln ln lnF t F ti t F t i t i t i t
i t i t
A A
A a A u
A A
γ λ µγ− −
− −
   
∆ = ∆ + + + × +      
   
 [3.5] 
Intuitively, parameter µ measures whether taxation induces distortionary effects that 
alter resources away from Efficiency Enhancement Activities (EEA) hampering firm 
i’s absorptive capacity and thus decelerating productivity growth. 
The definition of the frontier firm (F) is rather important in the 
implementation of [3.4] and [3.5] as it will capture the distance from the productivity 
leader as well as the potential for catch-up  for each individual firm i. Our benchmark 
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definition for F is the firm with the highest productivity in industry j at year t (i.e.
max jA ).In our sensitivity analysis, we replicate the benchmark specifications with 
two alternative definitions for the frontier. We take the firm with the highest 
productivity in the whole sample (i.e. max tA ) at year t and the 5% of firms with the 
highest productivity in industry j in year t.  
 To obtain the distance that firm i lies behind the frontier in the long-run steady 
state one needs to solve the reduced form expression [3.4] to obtain the following 
condition:  
 
,
ln i i F
F j
A
A
γ γ
λ
  −
=  
 
: Distance from the Industry Frontier [3.6] 
 
4. Empirical Implementation 
4.1. Dataset Description 
For the empirical estimation of the TFP growth equation we use data from FAME, 
which provides access to balance sheet and income statement items for both private 
and public companies in the UK. The time span of the data used in this paper covers 
the period from 2004 to 2011. The rationale for considering three years before the 
recent crisis period is to examine the slowdown in firm productivity during the crisis 
years. This would also allow us to gauge whether the frontier firm’s productivity has 
declined from its peak level during 2004-06.The sectoral coverage of the firms is 
restricted to manufacturing which is defined according to the NACE Rev.2 
classification and include firms that fall within the industrial classification between 
1011-3299. The initial firm population refers to 14,222 firms annually. For the 
calculation of TFP, we merge FAME data with various deflators at the industry level 
obtained by Office of National Statistics (ONS). After this merging, the number of 
firms reduces to a balanced panel of 13062 firms.  Nevertheless, there have been firms 
with data missing in variables needed to construct TFP and other core variables of the 
analysis. Regarding the calculation of TFP, we define value added as the difference of 
total sales adjusted for inventories with costs in materials. Sales and inventories  are 
expressed in constant 2005 prices using an output price deflator at the four-digit 
industry level while cost expenditures are deflated using an industry invariant material 
price index. 
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Figure 1 shows a clear negative correlation between productivity performance (TFP in 
this case) and effective tax rate (ETR). The latter is computed as the share of 
corporate tax over gross profits. This preliminary evidence supports our initial 
argument that higher tax rates decrease working capital and thus impede market 
expansion and investment. Figure 2 is an initial indication regarding returns to R&D. 
The positive correlation illustrated in the graph is clear and shows that there are 
positive private returns to R&D as the evidence is at company level (not industry). 
Our empirical evidence enriches this point with the regressions later in the paper 
emphasising the importance of R&D in productivity growth. In this line of argument, 
Figure 3 supports the idea that R&D active firms as well as exporting firms tend to be 
closer to the frontier. For example, the number 0.72 for R&D active firms indicate 
that on average an R&D active firm’s TFP is equal to 72% TFP of the frontier’s while 
for the R&D inactive firm the distance is bigger, currently 67%. One could argue that 
the difference in the GAP between R&D and non-R&D firms (or exporting and non-
exporting firms) is not large enough. Because the time span is relatively small, the 
dynamics of convergence process cannot be fully captured. Given that time series in 
firm level data are always shorter, 5 percentage points distance from the frontier 
between R&D and non-R&D active firms is still a considerable difference. 
Figure 1: TFP versus Effective Tax Rate (Corporate Tax over Profits)
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Figure 2: TFP Growth versus R&D Intensity 
 
 
Figure 3: Distance from the Frontier for Different Groups 
 
Note: Distance is calculated as the exponential value of GAP. See the text for more details about the 
interpretation of these figures. 
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Appendix A1 outlines the behavioral framework of Olley and Pakes (1996). 
Regarding the key state variable of OP, capital stock, it is approximated by the value 
of fixed assets as reported in FAME. We use capital price index at the four-digit level 
to convert capital related variables into 2005 constant prices. Investment is derived 
from the following perpetual inventory method: , , , 1(1 )i t i t i tI k kδ += − − , where k is the 
value of capital stock. The raw measure of tax used in the paper refers to corporate tax 
figures as reported in FAME database. To reflect the actual tax paid by firms in the 
sample and unlike much of the literature (Arnold et al. (2011), Gemmell et al. 
(2012))12 on the issue, we adopt the definition of the effective tax rate introduced by 
Djankov et al. (2010). This measure reflects the tax that firms pay if they comply with 
the country’s laws and is defined as the actual corporate income tax over the pre-tax 
profits. In order to take into account the time value of money we discount this 
measure with a typical value of 4% as a representative discounting factor. By this we 
introduce the final measure of actual tax paid which we call discounted effective tax 
rate (DETR). Finally, we define as exporters all the firms which report positive values 
of exports for all the years in the sample and as research-active all the firms which 
report a positive value in the R&D account of the balance sheet for all eight years 
examined here. This definition can be regarded as too strict firms but given the short 
time span of our panel we prefer excluding from the sample the export and R&D 
active firms – those that sporadically devote resources to these activities. Table A2 
provides a short description of all variables taken from FAME. 
 
4.2. Econometric Specification 
The econometric model is derived from equation [3.5] and treats TFP growth as a 
function of DETR, a vector γ i of individual characteristics and a term for productivity 
catch-up. The specification is written as: 
 , 2 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 1 ,ln lni t F t i t i t t t j i tTFP a TFP DETR GAP S uβ γβ λ δ η− − −∆ = ∆ + + + + ϒ + +  [4.1] 
 
                                                          
12 These studies use an exogenous measure of tax which essentially captures the level of statutory tax 
directly associated with changes happening at the macroeconomic policy environment 
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For the ease of exposition, the term , 1i tGAP − , refers to the relative TFP between firm i 
and frontier firm F.  As discussed in the previous section, the benchmark definition of 
F is , 1
, 1
i t
F t
TFP
TFP
−
−
, with , 1 , 1maxF t j tTFP TFP− −= , where j denotes industry. Appendix Tables 
A4 and A5 show summary statistics of GAP for different definitions of F. For 
example, figures presented in the first column of Table A4 indicate that average 
firm’s TFP is 68.6% of the frontier’s TFP; in other words, the distance from the 
frontier is 32% (1-0.68=0.32). The distance from the national frontier is bigger as 
shown in column 2 while the distance from the 5% more productive firms in the 
industry is relatively smaller. Section 6 explores whether taking alternative definitions 
of the frontier can drive our econometric results. 
The estimated coefficient of the GAP term is expected to have a negative sign 
indicating that as firms fall behind the frontier they tend to grow faster. Parameter 1β
captures the distortionary effect of corporate tax on TFP growth and 2β is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated and mainly referring to firm i’s export and R&D activities. 
We have also augmented the econometric model with a set of year (ϒ ) and four-digit 
NACE sector ( S ) dummies to capture common macroeconomic effects as well as 
fixed idiosyncrasies at the industry level. The above benchmark specification is 
augmented with an interaction term of GAP and DETR to assess whether the corporate 
tax affects the speed of technology transfer. This effect is captured by parameterβ3 in 
specification [4.2]: 
 
, 2 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 1
3 1 , 1 ,
ln lni t F t i t i t t
t i t t j i t
TFP a TFP DETR GAP
GAP DETR S u
β γβ λ
β δ η
− − −
− −
∆ = ∆ + + + +
+ × + ϒ + +  [4.2] 
If the hypothesis that corporate tax is heavily distortionary is valid then the estimated 
coefficient of the autonomous DETR variable is expected to be negative while the sign 
of the interaction term must be positive.  
 
5. Results Baseline Specifications 
5.1 Pooled OLS Results 
Table 1 illustrates results from specifications [4.1] and [4.2]. Columns (1) and (2) 
show estimations from the whole sample where vector γ  control for export and R&D 
activity by using binary variables to indicate whether firm i is export active and R&D 
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active. The GAP term is negative and highly significant confirming the convergence 
hypothesis. Likewise, firms that are export and R&D active tend to experience faster 
rates of TFP growth although the coefficient of the export dummy is insignificant in 
conventional statistical terms. Turning to the key variable of interest, both columns 
reveal a negative estimate of DETR and highly statistically significant while the 
interaction term ( 1 , 1t i tGAP DETR− −× ) is positive and significant. This baseline result is 
consistent with the fundamental hypothesis tested in the paper that high corporate tax 
slows down the rate of TFP growth. Given that the DETR measure is weighted by 
profitability this result confirms the hypothesis that, as tax liabilities increase relative 
to profits, then firms lack the resources required for capital investment. This effect is 
more likely to come about by a decrease in working capital which is necessary for 
obtaining external funding as pointed out in Arnold et al. (2011) and Gemmell et al. 
(2012).This negative effect is greater, the greater is the distance of firm i from the 
technological frontier. 
In column (3), we control for the intensity of export and R&D activity rather 
than status. We use exports to total sales ratio and R&D as a share of value added. 
The results confirm the importance of R&D in stimulating innovation rates as well as 
the existence of learning by exporting gains. Column (3) also provides evidence for 
the hypothesis of absorptive capacity (see Griffiths et al. (2004)) that higher levels of 
export and research intensity contribute to more effective imitations of the 
technological advancements of the frontier. As in firm level studies the estimated 
coefficient of R&D intensity can be interpreted as the private return to innovation 
(Jones and Williams, 1998), the current value is 0.048, broadly consistent with what is 
documented in the literature (Grilliches, 1992).13Columns (4) and (5) test whether 
corporate tax affects the speed of convergence by extracting resources from efficiency 
enhancement activities damaging the degree of absorptive capacity. To do so, we use 
two interaction terms ( 1 , 1 1t i t tGAP DETR ES− − −× × and 1 , 1 1t i t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× × ). The 
estimates of these interaction terms in columns (4) and (5) are positive but 
insignificant.  
  
                                                          
13 The private rate of R&D return is smaller than the social one. Cameron et al. (2005) reveals a rate of 
R&D return for the UK Manufacturing in the interval of 0.40 to 0.60 but this magnitude refers to social 
return that already captures the possibility of positive R&D related spillovers generated from inter-firm 
linkages.  
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Table 1: Pooled OLS Regressions of TFP growth- UK Firms 2004-2011 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 0.188*** 0.176*** 0.260*** 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.276*** 
 (10.44) (8.31) (4.44) (3.85) (3.87) (4.09) 
1tGAP−  -0.187
*** -0.128*** -0.257*** -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.252*** 
 (-9.41) (-5.69) (-3.60) (-3.39) (-3.35) (-3.26) 
Exporter 0.003 0.002     
 (1.17) (0.82)     
R&D Active 0.011*** 0.010***     
 (3.56) (3.10)     
ES 1t−  
 
  
0.015** 
(2.46) 
0.015** 
(2.55) 
0.015** 
(2.53) 
0.012** 
(2.25) 
RDS 1t−    
0.030** 
(2.43) 
0.029** 
(2.26) 
0.029** 
(2.25) 
0.030** 
(2.27) 
DETR 1t−  
-0.005*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.011*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.43) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
Interaction Terms 
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   
0.005*** 
(2.81)  
-0.002 
(-0.86)   
1 1t tGAP ES− −×    
-0.020** 
(-2.45) 
-0.020** 
(-2.51) 
-0.018** 
(-2.29) 
-0.018** 
(-2.39) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×    
-0.032* 
(-1.96) 
-0.032* 
(-1.81) 
-0.032* 
(-1.80) 
-0.028 
(-1.55) 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR ES− − −× ×      
0.001 
(1.06)  
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× ×
 
     
0.005*** 
(3.51) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 2  3770 16877 3913 3913 3913 3821 
F-statistic 545.93 26.81 55.08 306.20 131.31 186.79 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESET 134.42 6.98 14.09 14.15 16.21 23.97 
p-value 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: GAP stands for the distance of productivity for a given firm from the industry frontier. Exporter 
is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is exporter for all the years of the sample and zero 
otherwise. R&D active is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is research active and zero 
otherwise. ES stands for the export share and RDS stands for the research share. DETR stands for 
discounted effective tax rate. RESET test refers to the hypothesis that the model has no omitted 
variables. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses are consistent for robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. 
 
To explore further the possibility that the distortionary effect of corporate tax 
varies between exporting and (non-exporting) firms as well as between R&D active 
and R&D inactive firms, we split our initial sample into two sub-samples according to 
export and R&D status. We then replicate the estimation of column (1) from Table 1. 
This specification can be informative to whether firms that are not engaged in export 
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and research activity tend to catch-up more slowly making the distortionary effect of 
taxation even higher. Estimates from this specification are shown in Table 2. The 
autonomous effect of DETR is negative and statistically significant in both groups 
whereby the interaction term , 1 , 1i t i tGAP DETR− −×  is insignificant in the group of 
exporting and research active firms.  This result can be viewed as evidence that 
research active and exporting firms manage to compensate more easily the losses 
from higher taxation and thus the speed of convergence is not affected significantly. 
This effect is more likely attributed to the fact that exporting and research active firms 
are naturally closer to the frontier and thus any taxation-induced effect harms less 
compared to domestically oriented firms as well as those that are not R&D active.   
 
Table 2: Pooled OLS Regressions of TFP growth. Exporters-Non Exporters and 
R&D- Non R&D active firms 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
 Exporters Non-Exporters Research Active Non-Research 
Active 
Constant 0.110*** 0.137*** 0.120*** 0.131*** 
 (4.83) (4.95) (6.26) (5.12) 
1tGAP−  -0.111
*** -0.139*** -0.064*** -0.142*** 
 (-4.44) (-4.59) (-2.89) (-5.09) 
DETR 1t−  -0.006
** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.007*** 
 (-2.27) (-3.29) (-1.93) (-3.73) 
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×  0.005 0.005
** 0.004 0.005** 
 (1.44) (2.36) (1.62) (2.25) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 3346 13531 3913 12964 
F-statistic 18.65 31.31 9.27 36.62 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RESET 6.27 14.76 17.62 7.66 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Definition of variables is identical to Table 1. As exporters are defined firms that report sales to 
international markets for all years of the sample 2004-2011. Similarly, R&D active firms are defined as 
those that report R&D spending in all years of the sample. RESET test refers to the hypothesis that the 
model has no omitted variables. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses are consistent for robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. 
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Table 3: Pooled OLS Regressions of TFP growth: Identifying Non-Linearities 
 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 0.243*** 0.259*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 
 (13.54) (13.62) (5.12) (3.62) (3.56) (3.62) 
1tGAP−  -0.244
*** -0.268*** -0.135*** -0.150*** -0.140** -0.150*** 
 (-14.51) (-13.69) (-4.62) (-2.67) (-2.50) (-2.68) 
Exporter -0.002 -0.002     
 (-0.81) (-0.83)     
R&D Active 0.018*** 0.018***     
 (7.04) (7.01)     
ES 1t−    0.006 -0.046 -0.038 -0.046 
   (0.62) (-0.83) (-0.69) (-0.85) 
RDS 1t−    0.004 0.116
*** 0.116*** 0.105** 
   (0.43) (3.92) (3.92) (2.14) 
DETR 1t−  0.073
*** -0.071 0.102*** 0.118 0.117 0.124 
 (5.34) (-1.26) (2.86) (1.20) (1.15) (1.26) 
(DETR 21)t−  -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.109** -0.119** -0.113** -0.120** 
 (-2.90) (-3.04) (-2.07) (-2.33) (-2.20) (-2.36) 
Interaction Terms  
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   0.214
***  -0.012 -0.080 -0.016 
  (2.65)  (-0.10) (-0.65) (-0.13) 
1 1t tGAP ES− −×     0.074 0.048 0.075 
    (0.98) (0.62) (0.98) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×     -0.219
*** -0.219*** -0.191 
    (-4.20) (-4.20) (-1.65) 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR ES− − −× ×      0.141
** 
(2.12) 
 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× ×       -0.054 
(-0.26) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 38033 38033 3738 3738 3738 3738 
F- statistic 1820 411.78 228.43 7900 1357.54 38.96 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESET 74.98 13.15 37.86 25.37 16.33 17.30 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Notes: GAP stands for the distance of productivity for a given firm from the industry frontier. Exporter is a 
dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is exporter for all the years of the sample and zero otherwise. R&D 
active is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is research active and zero otherwise. ES stands for the 
export share and RDS stands for the research share. DETR stands for discounted effective tax rate.  RESET test refers 
to the hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses are consistent 
for robust standard errors clustered by firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. 
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5.2 The identification of non-linear effects between TFP and Taxation  
Estimations in Tables 1 and 2 implicitly assume that taxation causes productivity 
distortions at any levels. In other words, the TFP-taxation nexus is linear over all 
levels of effective tax rate. Nevertheless, the plot illustrated in Figure 1 indicates that 
this relationship could be non-linear. A quadratic prediction plot between Total Factor 
Productivity Growth and DETR shown in Figure 4 reveals an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. This means that at low levels of corporate tax, productivity growth co-
moves with tax share while there is a critical threshold beyond which further increases 
in corporate tax slow down productivity growth. To assess the empirical validity of 
such hypothesis, we introduce a quadratic term of DETR in the lnTFPD equation. 
Results from these specifications are illustrated in Table 3. 
 
The quadratic term is always negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
while the linear term is positive and mainly insignificant. These findings are 
supportive of a non-linear relationship and allow us to derive from the estimated 
equations the critical value of DETR beyond which the deceleration of TFP growth 
occurs. We take the specification in column (3) where continuous measures of export 
and R&D activity are included and both DETR terms are statistically significant. The 
estimated equations are written as: 
 
2
1 1 1
1 1
0.144 0.135 0.102 0.109( )
0,006 0.004
t t t
t t
TFP GAP DETR DETR
ES RDS
- - -
- -
D = - + -
+ +
 
From this equation, we can figure out that the turning point is equal to 46.7%.14This 
share indicates that any corporate tax paid above this threshold causes effectively 
deceleration in firm’s Total Factor Productivity Growth. The headline corporate 
statutory tax rate has declined over time in the UK (to 23% in 2013 from 33% in 
1996).The effective corporate tax rates however could differ by firm size and industry. 
Smaller firms could experience a higher effective corporate tax rate relative to larger 
                                                          
14The reader can find summary statistics for Discounted Effective Tax Rate for different percentiles in 
Table A6 in the Appendix. As it is shown in Table A6, for the 5% of firms the effective amount of 
corporate tax paid is around 40% while for the 1% the amount paid is above 70%. These figures 
indicate substantial differences in the amount of corporate tax paid, which also indicate that the actual 
tax burden for each firm varies significantly from the statutory policy tax set by fiscal authorities.  
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firms, and thereby could end up with a negative productivity growth when the rate 
exceeds the critical threshold level. 
 
Figure 4: Non-Linear Prediction for the TFP Growth- Tax Rate Relationship 
 
 
6. Some Sensitivity Tests 
An issue of potential endogeneity bias emerges in equations [4.1] and [4.2] between 
the rate of TFP growth and the gap term due to the presence of TFP level in both sides 
of the equation. Additionally, TFP can be subject to measurement errors that are 
unobserved from the econometrician and can potentially produce spurious 
econometric results. The OP framework applied for the calculation of TFP accounts 
for endogeneity bias between the selection of inputs and output, although a series of 
other issues remain unresolved. For example, capital might not always be under full 
utilization introducing short term rigidities that can cause efficiency losses without 
necessarily reflecting technical changes. Similarly, OP methodology does not address 
cases in which firms experience monopolistic power that might lead to economies of 
scale and can be mistakenly attributed to technological progress. To address these 
sources of endogeneity and measurement bias we use an Instrumental Variables (IV) 
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estimation framework to test the robustness of benchmark results presented in Table 
1. 
A crucial issue when a lagged dependent variable (i.e. TFPi,t-1 ) appears on the 
right hand–side of the equation is to identify the degree of bias.15The latter is 
associated with the panel structure of the data. As Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen 
(1999)have shown when the number of firms (N) is sufficiently greater than the 
number of years (T) (the case in the current paper) a GMM estimator produces a 
lower Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and thus it is more efficient. In the absence of 
any exogenous instruments with the desired properties which are to be correlated with 
the endogenous variable (GAP) but uncorrelated with the error term (u) in equations 
[4.1] and [4.2] we consider the case of a “restricted” GMM16 that uses as instruments 
a sub-set of higher order lags of the endogenous variables. Before proceeding with 
this estimation, we first examine for the presence of serial correlation in our 
estimations by applying the Arellano-Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation. As 
presented in Table 4, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is not rejected for third 
and fourth lags of the endogenous variable. Thus, we instrument GAP and its 
associated terms with their third and fourth order lags. At the bottom of Table 4, we 
report Sargan-Hansen statistic values that test the validity of instruments. Under the 
null, the instruments included are uncorrelated with the error term, thus they are valid. 
Sargan-Hansen test follows the Chi-squared distribution with (L-K) degrees of 
freedom.17Another test of robustness implemented is to re-estimate some of our 
baseline specifications using the Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) (2003) non-parametric 
technique for estimating TFP. The key difference between OP and LP is that the latter 
uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks. The 
rationale behind this is that intermediate inputs perform better than investment in 
external shocks hence using them can provide more consistent TFP estimates. In our 
                                                          
15Nickell (1981) has shown that in panels with long time series cross section dimension the endogeneity 
bias is of order 1/T, where T is the number of years. Therefore, the bias tends to zero and thus a 
standard Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) can be both efficient and unbiased. Nonetheless, 
Judson and Owen (1999) have determined as a rule of thumb that the number of years needs to be close 
to 30 in order for the bias to tend to∞. In cases with smaller T the degree of bias can still be as high as 
equal to 20% in the coefficient of interest. The time and cross- section dimension of our panel is a 
typical microeconomic one and based on the Monte Carlo experiments of Kiviet (1995) and Judson and 
Owen (1999), GMM is the best option.   
16 A “restricted” GMM increases computational efficiency without detracting from its effectiveness.  A 
necessary condition that makes plausible the use of lagged endogenous variables as instruments is the 
absence of serial correlation in the residuals. 
17L is the number of instruments and K is the number of regressors. 
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case, an insight about the differences between the two approaches can be taken in 
Figure A3 (Appendix). The fit between the two is very similar with a correlation score 
equal to 0.70 although OP tends to be slightly upward biased. Table 5 shows POLS 
estimates from LP TFP. The main results however remain robust with regard to the 
distortionary tax effect and the private return to R&D. Interestingly Table 5 shows a 
negative and statistically significant interaction term between DETR and R&D share 
that indicates how corporate tax increases can harm a firm’s absorptive capacity.  
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Table 4: GMM Regressions of TFP growth  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 0.069*** 0.063** 0.156** 0.170*** 0.182*** 0.207*** 
 (5.87) (2.54) (2.35) (2.59) (2.75) (2.94) 
1tGAP−  -0.068*** -0.054 -0.196** -0.210** -0.234** -0.343*** 
 (-4.51) (-1.28) (-2.08) (-2.24) (-2.39) (-2.86) 
Exporter -0.003 -0.002     
 (-1.11) (-0.40)     
R&D Active 0.006* -0.002     
 (1.90) (-0.12)     
ES 1t−    -0.000 -0.044 -0.0001 -0.0001 
   (-0.06) (-0.87) (-0.01) (-0.2) 
RDS 1t−    0.018 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
   (3.01) (3.05) (3.03) (3.07) 
DETR 1t−  -0.002 -0.000 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.009*** 
 (-1.52) (-0.03) (-3.30) (-3.08) (-3.15) (-3.01) 
Interaction Terms 
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   -0.016     
  (-0.98)     
1 1t tGAP ES− −×    0.002 0.059 0.020 0.014 
   (0.14) (0.86) (0.25) (0.19) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×    -0.041 -0.067** -0.061* -0.089** 
   (-1.46) (-2.01) (-1.88) (-2.41) 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR ES− − −× ×      -0.005 (-0.50)  
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× ×       0.023* 
      (1.95) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 10824 4533 1508 1573 1573 1573 
Wald Test 23.76 1.77 18.85 22.07 23.37 20.35 
p-value 0.0001 0.8800 0.0044 0.0025 0.0029 0.0091 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.043 3.079 3.990 3.220 5.168 5.897 
p-value 0.8352 0.2145 0.2626 0.5216 0.3957 0.3164 
Arrelano Bond test for autocorrelation 
Lag(3) 2.26 
[0.023] 
0.96 
[0.33] 
0.38 
[0.703] 
0.36 
[0.721] 
0.37 
[0.715] 
0.44 
[0.663] 
Lag(4) 0.41 [0.681] 
0.96 
[0.33] 
0.24 
[0.80] 
0.25 
[0.802] 
0.22 
[0.824] 
0.30 
[0.763] 
Notes: Endogenous variables are considered GAPt-1 and its associated terms and as instruments used 
GAPt-3 ,GAPt-4 and their associated interaction terms with, ES, RDS and DETR. Wald test refers to the 
joint significance of all second stage regressors and Sargan-Hansen test refers to the identification of 
instruments, under the null hypothesis the instrument used are valid (see the text for further 
information). First stage estimates reported for the exogenous variables (Exporter, R&D Active, ES, 
RDS, and DETR). Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses are consistent for robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. 
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Finally, we pose the question whether our benchmark results are sensitive to the 
definition of the frontier. We investigate this by applying two alternative definitions 
for the frontier firm. First, GAP is calculated as the distance of the focal firm from the 
national frontier, max TFPt  (i.e. the firm with the highest TFP level in the whole 
sample at a given year) and second GAP is calculated as the distance from the 5% 
percentile of the firms with the highest TFP level in the industry at a given year. We 
replicate benchmark specifications for these alternative definitions and results are 
reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 
The pattern of estimates from these sensitivity tests does not change significantly 
our baseline results. The GAP term remains negative and significant throughout all 
columns in Table 4 implying that any potential endogeneity bias has not driven our 
initial findings. Similarly, the negative impact of DETR on TFP growth remains 
confirming once again the distortionary character of taxation for productivity 
performance. This result suggests that lower corporate tax rate can improve firm 
productivity which corroborates the finding in the tax structure literature that 
substantial welfare gains can be obtained from tax reforms that decrease the capital 
tax rate relative to the labour/consumption tax rates (see Angelopoulos et al., 2012). 
Some alterations exist only in the interaction terms of GAP with DETR and Export 
activity (ES) that are now statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Using LP 
algorithm to calculate TFP, the GAP term appears insignificant in two of the 
specifications indicating a weaker convergence process but the results concerning 
R&D and DETR remain robust. 
 Turning to the specifications with a different definition for the frontier unit, the 
pattern of the estimated coefficients does not change substantially. The only notable 
difference in comparison to baseline estimates shown in Table 1 is that Tables 6 and 7 
could not reveal direct export gains as the coefficient of export intensity is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, both tables indicate clearly that the greater is firm i’s 
export orientation the better the absorptive capacity, a result that one can interpret as 
an indirect productivity benefit derived from exports.  
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Table 5: TFP Growth Estimates with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) Approach  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Constant -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.086** -0.100** 
 (-3.52) (-3.53) (-1.97) (-2.21) 
1tGAP−  -0.248*** -0.252*** -0.338*** -0.330*** 
 (-8.69) (-8.44) (-2.80) (-2.60) 
Exporter 0.004* 0.004*   
 (1.96) (1.89)   
R&D Active     
     
ES 1t−    0.086* 0.095* 
   (1.73) (1.86) 
RDS 1t−    -0.026* -0.026* 
   (-1.94) (-1.93) 
DETR 1t−  -0.017*** -0.009* -0.023** -0.008* 
 (-2.89) (-1.92) (-2.44) (-1.81) 
Interaction Terms 
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   0.054*  0.108 
  (1.83)  (1.47) 
1 1t tGAP ES− −×    0.250 0.285* 
   (1.54) (1.70) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×    -0.077*** -0.079*** 
   (-3.44) (-3.38) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 29371 29371 2911 2911 
F-statistic 27.07 24.91 8.21 5.08 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESET 105.52 105.17 65.63 58.25 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: TFP is calculated using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) non-parametric technique. All estimates 
are from Pooled OLS regressions.GAP stands for the distance of productivity for a given firm from the 
industry frontier. Exporter is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is exporter for all the 
years of the sample and zero otherwise. R&D active is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm 
is research active and zero otherwise. ES stands for the export share and RDS stands for the research 
share. DETR stands for discounted effective tax rate. RESET test refers to the hypothesis that the model 
has no omitted variables. Coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses are consistent for robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. 
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Table 6: Pooled OLS Regressions of TFP growth with National Frontier 
Notes: The specification of this table is identical to the one presented in Table 1 with the exception that 
here frontier firm (F) is set the one with the highest TFP level in the whole sample (national frontier) at 
year t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 0.187*** 0.179*** 2.288*** 2.290*** 2.293*** 2.28*** 
 (10.93) (8.86) (12.67) (12.63) (12.66) (12.63) 
1tGAP−  -0.254*** -0.179*** -4.011*** -4.015*** -4.021*** -4.014*** 
 (10.09) (-6.34) (-12.67) (-12.63) (-12.67) (-12.63) 
Exporter 0.003 0.002     
 (1.17) (0.84)     
R&D Active 0.012** 0.011***     
 (3.76) (3.29)     
ES 1t−    0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
   (1.16) (1.14) (1.07) (1.14) 
RDS 1t−    0.041 0.041 0.042 0.041 
   (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) 
DETR 1t−  -0.005** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.36) (-3.90) (-2.88) (-2.87) (-2.87) (-2.87) 
Interaction Terms       
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   0.007***     
  (2.98)     
1 1t tGAP ES− −×    -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.030** -0.032** 
   (-2.65) (-2.62) (-2.23) (-2.62) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×    -0.046 -0.046 -0.047 -0.045 
   (-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.00) (-0.98) 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR ES− − −× ×
 
    0.003 (1.41)  
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× ×       
0.0006 
(0.71) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 23770 16877 3913 3913 3913 3913 
F-statistic 225.75 99.48 35.51 30.38 30.97 30.30 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESET 127.02 5.23 17.38 17.51 18.71 25.68 
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 7: Pooled OLS Regressions of TFP growth with Frontier the 5% Percentile 
of Highest TFP in the Industry 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 0.174*** 0.169*** 1.527*** 1.527*** 1.528*** 1.526*** 
 (10.62) (8.67) (10.76) (10.75) (10.76) (10.75) 
1tGAP−  -0.164
*** -0.115*** -1.631*** -1.631*** -1.633*** -1.631*** 
 (-9.76) (-6.07) (-9.70) (-9.70) (-9.71) (-9.70) 
Exporter 0.003 0.002     
 (1.13) (0.81)     
R&D Active 0.011*** 0.011***     
 (3.64) (3.23)     
ES 1t−  
 
  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
   (1.37) (1.37) (1.33) (1.37) 
RDS 1t−    0.092
*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
   (3.13) (3.13) (3.14) (3.13) 
DETR 1t−  -0.005
*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.32) (-3.92) (-2.82) (-2.82) (-2.82) (-2.82) 
Interaction Terms 
1 1t tGAP DETR− −×   0.005
***     
  (3.07)     
1 1t tGAP ES− −×    -0.024
** -0.024** -0.022** -0.023** 
   (-2.29) (-2.29) (-2.11) (-2.29) 
1 1t tGAP RDS− −×    -0.069
* -0.069* -0.069** -0.069** 
   (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.96) 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR ES− − −× ×
 
    0.001 
(0.63) 
 
1 1 1t t tGAP DETR RDS− − −× ×
 
      
0.001 
(0.08) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic Tests 
Observations 23770 16877 3913 3913 3913 3913 
F-statistic 172.48 75.70 28.798 24.780 24.856 24.660 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESET 143.88 8.96 19.26 19.61 21.33 25.75 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The specification of this table is identical to the one presented in Table 1 with the exception that 
here frontier firm (F) is defined as the a hypothetical firm with TFP at  year t the average TFP level of 
the 5% most productive firms of the industry.  
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7. Conclusions 
This paper looks at how corporate taxation affects productivity performance at the 
firm level. In principle, corporate taxation might embody distortionary effects that can 
be passed on into productivity losses. Our aim in this paper has been to add to the 
limited body of evidence in the tax-productivity domain by studying the effects of 
corporate tax levels within an international framework of firm productivity catch-up. 
By attempting to include the existence of firm-level heterogeneity, both across and 
within industries, we hope to add to a better understanding of the convergence process 
in productivity levels between countries. 
Using UK firm-level data, we looked at whether the firm’s corporate tax 
burden slows the speed of productivity convergence and, if so, through which 
channels this deceleration is likely to take place. The main question posed being 
whether the taxation of profits affects capital investment. Our results suggest that 
higher rates of corporate taxation slow the rate of TFP growth. Our explanation for 
this is that increased tax liabilities, relative to profits, may reduce firm’s resources for 
capital investment. This effect is likely to come about via a decrease in working 
capital, necessary for obtaining external funding. In addition, we find that firms that 
are export and R&D active tend to experience faster rates of TFP growth. We interpret 
this result as an indirect productivity benefit that can be derived from exporting. 
Finally, a key policy inference from our results may be that the broader 
economic environment, and in particular national fiscal policy, can affect firm’s 
ability to catch up with prevailing international productivity norms. From a policy 
perspective it would appear that the greater a firm’s export orientation, the better its 
absorptive capacity for productivity enhancing ideas. If the negative distortionary 
effect of corporate tax, as uncovered in the paper, is the key channel through which 
firm productivity can recover or converge to the frontier, tax incentives for R&D 
related activities can have a positive effect on productivity in relatively open 
economies such as the UK after a deep economic slump. 
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Appendices 
A1.  Olley and Pakes Methodology 
Taking the logarithmic form of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function for firm 
i:   
 , 0 , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t i ty a k l m= + a + b + g + w + e  [A.1] 
where wand eare i.i.d idiosyncratic error terms. It is assumes that waffects firm i’s 
individual decisions whileε is a common shock to all firms (i.e. common changes in 
input prices, other macroeconomic shocks etc.). Estimating parameters ,a b and g
with OLS is problematic mainly due to the underlying selection bias between 
unobserved productivity shocks ,i tw and inputs in period t. Every period firm i decides 
whether to “exit” or “stay” in the market. In the conditional “stay” decision the firm 
also decides the amount of its inputs such as: investment (I), labour and material. 
Capital stock is accumulated over time by: , , , 1(1 )i t i t i tk k I -= - d + . The investment 
function depends on two state variables, capital stock ( k ) and productivity ( )w , 
, ,( , )i t i tI I k= w .the inverse investment is monotonic (Pakes (1994)) and thus 
productivity is a function of capital and investment:  
 , ,( , )i t i th k Iw=  [A.2] 
By substituting equation (A.2) into (A.1) we get the following production function: 
 , , , , , ,( , )i t i t i t i t i t i ty l m k Ib g f e= + + +  [A.3] 
where, , , 0 , , ,( , ) ( , )i t i t i t i t i tk I a k h k If a= + + .  
The OP algorithm is implemented in three stages: First stage, a partial linear 
estimation is used to obtain values for b and g . Second stage of the estimation refers 
to the exit decision of the firm and it is disentangled by endogeneity bias as the 
estimation of hˆ in the first stage takes into account any unobserved shock e . It is 
assumed that w  follows a first order Markov process:
, , , 1 , , 1 ,| ( )i t i t i t i t i t i tw w w n q w n- -é ù= E + = +ë û .Plugging the Markov-process in the 
production function:  
, 0 , , , , 1 , ,( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty a k l ma b g q w n e-= + + + + + +           [A.4] 
Production function can be written in a conditional form as follows: 
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, , 1 0 , , , , 1 , , ,
0 , , , , 1 , , , ,
[ | ,x=1] ( , )
ˆ                            ( , ( , ))
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
y a k l m
a k l m h k I
w a b g q w w n e
a b g q w n e
- -
-
E = + + + + + +
= + + + + + +
      
[A.5] 
Where x  equals to 1 if the firm has survived in the market till the end of period t. For 
the estimation of the survival probability on the second stage we approximate the 
unobserved productivity parameter ,i tw by the estimate of the inverse function obtained 
from the first stage. Equation [A.5] is estimated by a linear probit and the probability 
of surviving in period t is called Pt. Third stage, the coefficient of capital stock (state 
variable) is estimated fitting anon-linear least squares equation: 
 1 , , ,, , , ,0 , 1ˆ ˆ( , )ˆ ˆ t i t i t i ti t i t i t i t i t Py l m a k kq f n eb g a a- -- + +- - = + +  [A.6] 
 
A2. Description of FAME Variables 
Name Definition  
Output Deflated Total Sales by PPI  adjusted for 
firm inventories 
Capital  Fixed Assets in current GBP deflated by 
capital price index 
Materials Cost of Sales 
Labour Number of Employees 
Wages Wages and Salaries in GBP 
Age The number of years since the 
establishment of a corporation.  
Tax rate Corporation Tax over Profit (Loss) before 
Tax 
Total Sales Total Turnover in GBP 
Exports Overseas Turnover in GBP 
Notes: All values are recorded annually 
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Figure A3: Correlation between TFP Measures 
 
 
Table A4: Descriptive statistics for TFP growth (Olley-Pakes (1996))  
Year Mean SD MIN P25 P50 P75 MAX 
2005 4.33% 20.21% -3.81 -0.02 0.04 0.10 2.60 
2006 5.42% 18.64% -2.59 -0.01 0.05 0.11           3.00 
2007 5.87% 18.93% -3.05 -0.01 0.05 0.11 3.23 
2008 2.29% 21.09% -4.53 -0.04 0.02 0.08 3.04 
2009 -0.78% 22.65% -2.34 -0.09 0.00 0.07 4.86 
2010 4.94% 17.13% -2.39 -0.02 0.05 0.12 1.85 
2011 5.56% 16.97% -3.26 0.00 0.05 0.11 1.99 
Average 3.95% 19.37% -3.14 -0.03 0.04 0.10 2.94 
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Table A5: GAP Industry and GAP National Frontier Values 
Year GAPIndustry GAPNational GAP 95% Percentile 
2004 69.04% 51.17% 77.85% 
2005 68.92% 51.50% 77.95% 
2006 69.00% 51.49% 78.10% 
2007 68.93% 51.25% 78.31% 
2008 68.92% 50.89% 78.45% 
2009 68.38% 49.78% 79.22% 
2010 68.18% 49.99% 79.36% 
2011 68.28% 50.26% 79.52% 
Average 68.65% 50.68% 78.70% 
Notes: GAP Industry takes as frontier the firm with the highest TFP in the industry in year t, GAP 
National takes as frontier the firm with the highest TFP in the whole sample in year t and GAP 95% 
percentile takes as frontier a hypothetical firm with the average TFP of the five more productive firms 
in the industry in year t.  
 
Table A6: Discounted Effective Tax Rate (DETR) of UK Firms for Different 
Percentiles  
Year Mean SD P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 
2004 13.55% 16.36% 9.29% 22.97% 32.79% 42.62% 73.66% 
2005 13.10% 16.21% 7.63% 22.82% 32.09% 41.02% 73.81% 
2006 13.24% 16.22% 7.76% 23.08% 32.67% 41.64% 71.10% 
2007 13.27% 15.68% 8.76% 23.40% 31.89% 40.34% 67.39% 
2008 12.96% 16.47% 6.04% 23.31% 31.88% 40.91% 73.31% 
2009 12.68% 16.86% 3.16% 23.09% 32.77% 43.90% 75.00% 
2010 12.90% 16.21% 6.89% 23.21% 31.57% 41.20% 73.23% 
2011 11.89% 14.93% 6.38% 21.25% 28.90% 36.46% 69.54% 
Average 12.91% 16.11% 6.99% 22.81% 31.82% 40.98% 72% 
 
Table A7: Export and R&D shares 
Year Export share (ES) R&D Share (RDS) 
2004 0.163 0.034 
2005 0.169 0.032 
2006 0.172 0.026 
2007 0.179 0.025 
2008 0.180 0.025 
2009 0.176 0.022 
2010 0.175 0.021 
2011 0.180 0.021 
Average  0.175 0.024 
Notes: Export share is defined as exports over total sales and R&D share is defined as R&D 
expenditure over total cost.  
  
